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ABSTRACT 
We study a broad sample of firms across 32 countries and find that strong shareholder 
protections and better access to stock market financing lead to substantially higher long-run 
rates of R&D investment, particularly in small firms, but are unimportant for fixed capital 
investment. Credit market development has a modest impact on fixed investment but no 
impact on R&D.  These findings connect law and stock markets with innovative activities key 
to economic growth, and show that legal rules and financial developments affecting the 
availability of external equity financing are particularly important for risky, intangible 
investments not easily financed with debt.   
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An extensive literature shows that countries with legal systems providing strong protections for 
outside investors have larger, more accessible, and more developed stock markets (e.g., La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (LLS; 2006, 2008)). Furthermore, a number of studies find evidence of 
a positive connection between stock market development and broad measures of economic growth 
(e.g., Levine and Zervos (1998) and Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005)).  The literature provides 
much less evidence, however, directly linking law and finance with firm-level activities that promote 
economic growth.  The evidence that does exist indicates that the causal connections work principally 
through productivity growth rather than physical capital accumulation (see the Levine (2005) survey).  
For example, Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) find that legal “contracting institutions” promote stock 
market development but have no effect on aggregate investment in fixed capital, and Bekaert, Harvey, 
and Lundblad (2011) show that stock market liberalizations have a substantial impact on aggregate 
productivity but a relatively limited impact on fixed investment.     
In this study we identify a causal mechanism directly linking law and stock markets with a 
firm-level investment critical for innovation and productivity growth.  Our main idea is that access to 
stock market financing is particularly important for investment in research and development (R&D) 
because the nature of R&D sharply limits firms’ ability to use debt finance.  In particular, R&D 
investments are intangible and offer little or no collateral value.  In addition, since creditors share only 
in downside returns, the design of standard debt contracts does not work well for financing innovative 
investments characterized by a high probability of failure but some chance of extremely large upside 
returns.
 
 Supporting the idea that debt is poorly suited for funding R&D, a large empirical literature 
finds a strong negative association between R&D and leverage across firms (see the Hall and Lerner 
(2010) survey).  In contrast to R&D, fixed capital investments have collateral value and are typically 
less risky (e.g., often not investment in new technologies), making them easier to finance with debt if 
access to external equity is limited.  Thus, legal rules and financial developments that increase long-
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run access to stock market financing are potentially much more important for innovation and R&D-
led productivity growth than for physical capital accumulation. 
 We test these ideas by exploring how the type and amount of funding available from 
domestic financial markets affects long-run levels of firm investment in both R&D and fixed capital. 
Using multiple measures of the access that firms in a given country have to both equity and debt 
financing, we focus on four main empirical predictions that, to our knowledge, have not been 
evaluated previously.  First, we expect better access to stock market financing at the country level to 
have a positive effect on firm-level rates of R&D investment.  Second, we expect the availability of 
stock market financing to have the strongest effect on R&D investment in smaller and younger firms, 
as these firms are most likely to require external finance to fully fund investment demand.  Third, 
credit market access should be much less important than stock market access for R&D investment, 
given the shortcomings of debt for funding R&D.  Finally, stock markets should matter less for fixed 
capital investment than R&D, since firms can more readily substitute debt for equity.  
 To evaluate these predictions, we adopt the difference-in-difference methodology that 
Rajan and Zingales (RZ; 1998) use to identify the causal connection between financial development 
and industry-level growth.  The key insight in RZ is that if finance matters for growth, it should have 
a relatively stronger effect on the growth of industries that are more technologically dependent on 
external funds. This insight should extend to the firm level: if access to external finance matters for 
firm-level investment, it should matter most for firms located in industries with a relatively high 
technological demand for external funds.   
 We analyze approximately 5,300 firms across 32 countries over the period 1990 to 2007 
and find strong support for our main predictions.  In particular, access to stock market funding is 
especially important for R&D investment in smaller and younger firms, but has little or no impact on 
R&D investment in larger, more mature companies.  Specifically, our preferred estimates indicate that 
small-firm R&D (scaled by assets) in an industry highly dependent on external finance like 
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Instruments (75
th
 percentile in dependence) will be 0.022 higher than in a low-dependence industry 
like Textiles (25
th
 percentile), in a country with high stock market access like the Netherlands (75
th
 
percentile in stock market access) compared to a country with limited stock market access like South 
Africa (25
th
 percentile). This differential effect of stock market access on small-firm R&D is 
approximately one-third of the average small-firm R&D intensity, and thus establishes an 
economically important connection between access to stock market financing and innovative 
investment at the firm level.  In sharp contrast, we find no evidence of a connection between access to 
stock market financing and fixed investment.  Finally, while we find some evidence that access to 
credit matters for fixed investment, we find no evidence that access to credit matters for R&D. 
We also estimate the RZ regressions using legal rules and institutions as instruments for the 
country-level measures of stock market access. A large literature treats legal rules as exogenous 
determinants of financial market development, and of particular importance for our study, legal rules 
offering protection for minority investors and enforcement of private contracts appear to be especially 
important determinates of access to stock market financing (e.g., La Porta et al. (LLSV; 1997, 1998) 
and LLS (2006)).  Estimates from this instrumental variables approach indicate that exogenous 
variation in access to external equity, caused by differences in legal rules across countries, has an 
economically large and statistically significant effect on firm-level investment in R&D.  These results 
are of interest not only because they provide strong support for a causal connection between stock 
market access and R&D investment, but also because, despite considerable evidence that law affects 
financial development, it has generally been difficult to connect law to real activities that drive 
economic growth (see the discussion in LLS (2008)).  Our findings suggest that the financing of firm-
level innovative activity is one such channel. 
If law and stock markets matter for innovative investment in the way we have argued, there 
are three additional implications.  First, access to external equity should also be important for broader 
measures of intangible assets that, like R&D, may be difficult to finance with debt; indeed, we find a 
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strong positive connection between stock market access and intangible assets-to-fixed assets ratios for 
small firms but not large firms.  Second, R&D is an important input for growth, suggesting that better 
access to stock market financing should have a positive impact on firm growth rates, particularly 
among the firms most dependent on external sources to fund growth-enhancing investments.  We find 
a positive and significant relation between stock market access and rates of small-firm growth in both 
value-added and productivity.  Finally, our findings suggest that legal rules affecting the availability 
of stock market financing will have an important influence on how R&D is actually financed at the 
firm level.  Consistent with this expectation, we find that firms in countries with strong legal investor 
protections use significantly more external equity and have long-run R&D levels that are less tied to 
internally generated cash flows.     
Overall, our findings provide robust evidence that legal rules and financial market 
developments that increase access to stock market financing have a substantial positive impact on 
innovative investment at the firm level, but are much less important for firm investment in fixed 
capital.  We are aware of no other studies that establish these connections between law, stock markets, 
and innovative investment, or show that legal rules and the structure of financial markets have very 
different effects across R&D and fixed investment.  Given the importance of firm-level R&D 
investment for productivity and technological change (e.g., Griliches (1998) and Aghion and Howitt 
(1992)), these findings establish a previously unexplored channel connecting law and stock markets 
with economic growth.   
Our results are especially relevant for a set of related literatures that study how legal and 
financial institutions affect real activity. First, our evidence showing that productivity-enhancing 
R&D investments are particularly dependent on the funding supplied by stock markets can explain 
why stock market developments and liberalizations – which presumably lead to permanent increases 
in the supply of external equity finance – have long-lasting effects on productivity and economic 
growth (e.g., Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2011)).  Second, an influential branch of modern 
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growth theory emphasizes innovation and creative destruction by new entrants (e.g., Aghion and 
Howitt (1992)) and our findings are useful for understanding the role of stock markets in funding this 
process.  Third, our findings contribute to the debate about the relative merits of market- and bank-
based financial systems (e.g., Levine (2005)) by identifying a channel through which market-based 
systems should have an advantage in funding growth-enhancing real activities.  Fourth, while there is 
strong evidence that legal rules governing private contracting affect how investment is financed, there 
is little evidence that such rules affect the type or amount of investment that is undertaken.  Legal 
rules may not matter much for investment when firms can use debt to contract around weak legal 
investor protections (e.g., Acemoglu and Johnson (2005)); our findings, however, suggest that strong 
contracting institutions can matter a great deal for investments such as R&D that are not readily 
financed with debt. Finally, our study contributes to the debate concerning whether financial 
development disproportionately helps small or large firms (e.g., Beck et al. (2008)). 
Our insights on the causal mechanisms linking law, finance, innovative investment, and 
growth differ substantially from other studies that examine related issues.  Comparatively few 
empirical studies in the finance and growth literature focus specifically on R&D and innovation, and 
the studies that do (e.g., Aghion et al. (2012) and Pienknagura (2010)) do not emphasize the special 
importance of stock markets and legal investor protections for R&D.
1
  Similarly, related studies argue 
that the overall level of financial development and the quality of legal rules protecting private 
property can affect the mix of tangible and intangible assets at the industry level (e.g., Braun (2003) 
and Claessens and Laeven (2003)), but provide no intuition or evidence that the type of financial 
development and the quality of legal investor protections matter for R&D investment and the 
                                                          
1
 The few studies that document a connection between stock market funding and R&D are much more limited in 
scope.  For example, Kim and Weisbach (2008) examine how firms around the world spend the proceeds from 
new stock issues.  They use descriptive regressions to show that a large fraction of the proceeds from both IPOs 
and SEOs are eventually invested in R&D. They do not, however, examine the causal connections between 
financial market development and long-run levels of firm investment.  Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen (2009) 
document a strong connection between external equity issues and the late 1990s boom and bust in U.S. R&D, 
but their findings to not speak to the importance of legal rules and the nature of financial development for 
understanding long-run levels of firm investment across countries.                 
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accumulation of intangible assets.  Finally, several studies document a connection between credit 
market development and growth, and others discuss the potential for finance to foster growth via the 
influence it has on fixed investment.
2
  Our conclusions are in no way inconsistent with this literature, 
and though we emphasize the importance of a stock market-R&D connection for understanding the 
finance-growth nexus, our findings do not rule out alternative channels through which finance 
(including credit markets) can affect growth.  Our results do, however, suggest that credit market 
development promotes growth through channels other than the “financing innovation” channel we 
emphasize, and that stock market access may be particularly important in situations in which growth 
is driven primarily by intangible inputs rather than physical capital accumulation. 
Section I describes data, variables, and sample characteristics.  Section II reports the 
difference-in-difference results based on the RZ approach.  Section III presents evidence on how the 
legal environment influences the financing of R&D.  We summarize the key findings and discuss the 
most important implications in Section IV. 
I.  Data, Measurement, and Sample Characteristics 
A. Sample Construction 
To construct the sample we start with standardized financial statement information for firms 
with coverage in Compustat Global and Compustat North America over the period 1990 to 2007.  We 
focus on firm-level evidence because:  i) there is extensive heterogeneity in the need for external 
finance across firms, which we exploit in our empirical tests, ii) country-level data include R&D by 
universities and other organizations not relevant for our hypothesis, and iii) there is little evidence on 
                                                          
2
 For example, financial development can foster growth by increasing the efficiency of capital allocation across 
sectors, making fixed capital investments more responsive to growth opportunities, reducing the sensitivity of 
(short-run) capital spending to cash flow shocks, and reducing the volatility of fixed investment over the 
business cycle (see, for example, Wurgler (2000), Love (2003), Khurana, Martin, and Pereira (2006), Bekaert et 
al. (2007), Aghion et al. (2010), and McLean, Zhang, and Zhao (2012)).  
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the real impact that law and finance has at the firm level.
3
  We focus on firms that report fully 
consolidated financial statements and we exclude all firms with a primary industry classification in 
financials (SIC 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC 4900-4999).  We also drop firms without at least three 
nonmissing R&D observations and firms with no information on employment, which we use to 
identify small and large firms.
4
  Finally, we exclude all U.S. firms from the sample because in the RZ 
approach the U.S. is the benchmark for constructing measures of industry-level technological 
dependence on external funds. 
To construct the firm-level variables we start by scaling all variables by total assets and 
Winsorizing the ratios at the 1% level.  (All of our findings are robust to normalizing by sales rather 
than total assets or using alternative approaches to deal with potential outliers.)  We then calculate 
average values for each firm based on all nonmissing ratios over the sample period.  We focus on 
average values across firms, rather than yearly variation within firms, because we are interested in the 
long-run connection between stock market access and investment at the firm level.  It is especially 
problematic to use yearly variation to measure how access to external equity finance affects R&D 
because high adjustment costs likely cause firms to keep the path of R&D spending far smoother than 
stock issues, which are lumpy by nature and fluctuate sharply year-to-year (Brown and Petersen 
(2011)).       
We next merge the firm-level data with country-level economic, legal, and financial statistics 
collected from several different sources.  Table I contains definitions and data sources for each of the 
key variables in our study.  The final sample consists of approximately 5,300 firms across 32 
                                                          
3
 One notable exception is Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), who show that more efficient legal systems 
and more developed financial systems (active stock markets and a large banking sector) facilitate growth at the 
firm level.  Also see Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002), Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2005), 
and McLean, Zhang, and Zhao (2012).     
4
 We expect that setting missing R&D to zero in a sample like the one we study introduces substantial 
measurement error, as R&D is often missing even among firms in high-tech industries.  For this reason we focus 
only on firms that report some nonmissing values for R&D (note that we do not require firms to report positive 
R&D expenses).  Later in the paper we report results for a sample in which missing R&D values are set equal to 
zero. 
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countries.
5
  Table AI in the Appendix lists the 32 countries in the sample and presents key statistics on 
country income, legal rules, and financial market development.  As in other studies relying on 
international firm-level data (e.g., McLean, Zhang, and Zhao (2012)), firm counts differ substantially 
across the countries we sample.  Japan contributes a large share of the observations, partially because 
it is the largest economy in the study.  We report results for a sample that excludes the countries 
contributing the largest share of firms in the robustness section. 
[Insert Table I here] 
B. Measuring Access to External Finance 
Our focus is on the type of external finance that is available for firm investment, rather than 
simply the overall level of financial development.  Our primary measure of access to stock market 
financing is based on actual use of external equity finance by firms in a given country.  To construct 
this variable, we find the average ratio of net equity issues to total assets for all firms in our sample 
and then compute the country average across firms (Country equity issues).  We also report results 
using the country’s average ratio of equity issued by newly public firms to GDP over the period 1996 
to 2000 (IPOs/GDP).  This proxy is used by LLSV (1997) and LLS (2006) and should also be a good 
measure of the access that younger and smaller firms have to public equity markets.  Both Country 
equity issues and IPOs/GDP fit with Wachtel’s (2011) suggestion that measures of financial 
development should capture the degree to which new enterprises are able to access external financing.  
Also supporting the use of these equity funding measures, RZ note that dollars raised on country stock 
markets is potentially the most appropriate way to measure financial market development, but they do 
                                                          
5
 We attempt to include as many of the 49 countries in LLSV (1997, 1998) as possible.  We lose 15 countries 
due to insufficient firm-level data: Kenya, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Zimbabwe, Argentina, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Egypt, Jordan, Mexico, Peru, Portugal, Uruguay, and Venezuela.  We drop Taiwan due to lack of 
information on private credit to GDP.  As discussed, we exclude the U.S. since it provides the benchmark for 
external finance dependence in the RZ regressions.  Based on figures for 2007, the countries in our sample 
account for roughly 75% of global (non-U.S.) R&D (OECD, Main Science Technology Indicators (2009/1).  
China and Russia are the major countries excluded from our sample (and most other studies in the finance and 
growth literature).  Excluding the U.S., Russia, and China, our sample covers 91% of remaining global R&D.  
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not use such a measure because of lack of data.  Instead, their primary measure of financial 
development is a country’s accounting standards (Accounting standards), which we also use to link 
our results to those in RZ.  Of particular importance to our study, RZ (p. 571) argue that “the higher 
the standards of financial disclosure in a country, the easier it will be for firms to raise funds from a 
wider circle of investors.”  The “wider circle of investors” suggests that Accounting standards should 
be a particularly good proxy for ease of access to external equity finance, since unlike a bank loan, 
external equity is typically raised from large numbers of individual investors, each of whom may find 
that the fixed costs of information acquisition are prohibitive unless the accounting information 
released by the firm is of high quality.
6
  Consistent with this idea, Accounting standards is strongly 
correlated with both Country equity issues and IPOs/GDP across the countries in our sample. 
All three of the above measures return very similar results, as do a number of alternative 
measures that should also be good proxies for firm access to stock market financing (discussed in the 
next section).  We also examine the stock market capitalization-to-GDP ratio (MCAP/GDP), a broad 
measure of stock market development used in a number of other studies.  We get somewhat weaker 
results with the market capitalization ratio than with the other stock market measures, likely because 
market capitalization can be a relatively poor measure of the actual funding available from domestic 
equity markets.
7
 These weaker findings are consistent with a number of studies reporting that stock 
market capitalization is not strongly associated with either increased use of stock market financing 
                                                          
6
 Following RZ, the measure of accounting standards we use is based on how comprehensive annual reports 
actually are, rather than how comprehensive they are required to be.  As such, accounting standards, like other 
measures of financial development, is potentially endogenous. 
7
 We report regressions with MCAP/GDP in the Internet Appendix. We find a positive connection between 
MCAP/GDP and firm-level R&D, but only in the IV regressions for small and young firms is the estimate 
statistically significant at conventional levels. In our sample, unlike IPOs/GDP and Accounting standards, 
MCAP/GDP is only weakly correlated with Country equity issues.  One reason why MCAP/GDP may be a poor 
proxy for access to stock market financing is that a country’s publicly traded firms can have rather high stock 
market capitalization (e.g., ownership of valuable deposits of natural resources) yet at the same time these firms 
rarely use their stock markets as a source of funds.  Indeed, stock market capitalization ratios are surprisingly 
large values for several countries that arguably do not have highly developed stock markets. For example, in the 
pioneering study by LLSV (1997), a number of relatively undeveloped countries (e.g., South Africa (1.45)) had 
much larger stock market capitalization ratios than the U.S. (0.58).   
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(e.g., McLean, Zhang, and Zhao (2012)) or faster growth (e.g., Levine and Zervos (1998), Demirgüç-
Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), and Beck and Levine (2004)).
8
  
We use two proxies to measure firm access to credit markets.  The first is private domestic 
credit-to-GDP (Credit/GDP), the standard measure of credit market development used in numerous 
prior studies, including RZ.  However, like MCAP/GDP, while Credit/GDP may capture some cross-
country differences in the overall stage of development, it appears to be a relatively weak proxy for 
the access listed firms have to external debt funding.  For example, LLSV (1997) find similar use of 
debt among publicly traded firms regardless of country legal origin or credit market depth, and 
McLean, Zhang, and Zhao (2012) find no evidence that private credit-to-GDP is associated with 
reduced financing difficulties for listed firms.  We therefore also examine the value-weighted average 
debt-to-assets ratio across all sampled firms in a given country (Country-weighted leverage), which 
should be a better and more direct proxy for the ability of listed firms in a country to borrow.
9
       
C. Firm-Level Characteristics 
A key argument in our study is that access to external equity should be relatively more 
important for smaller and younger firms, since they are more likely to depend, ex ante, on costly 
external finance from domestic capital markets to fund investment demand.  Size and age are widely 
used criteria for identifying the firms most likely (a priori) to rely on costly external finance.  For 
example, Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2005) show that financial underdevelopment 
constrains growth in small firms much more than large firms, and Figure 1 in RZ shows that publicly 
traded U.S. firms issue stock primarily in the early part of their life cycle, suggesting that the 
technological demand for external funding is particularly pronounced in younger firms.   
                                                          
8
 RZ report a positive connection between industry growth rates and both total market capitalization (which 
includes stock market capitalization) and domestic credit in their initial table of regressions.  However, neither 
of these measures is quantitatively important or statistically significant once accounting standards is also 
included in the specification (see their Table 4).  Because of this, RZ use accounting standards as the primary 
measure of financial development in the remainder of their paper. 
9
 We thank the associate editor for suggesting that we examine this alternative measure of credit market access.   
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We use the number of employees to measure firm size, which is readily comparable across 
countries and is a standard way to sort firms into different size categories (e.g., Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
and Maksimovic (2005)).  We consider firms “small” if their average level of employment over the 
sample period is in the bottom 70% of all sampled firms, and we show in an Internet Appendix that 
the results are similar if we base the splits on the median value across firms or the relative size of 
firms within a given country.
10
  We proxy for relative age based on the years since the firm first 
appears in Compustat.  We consider firms that first appear in Compustat by 1990 as “mature,” and 
those appearing after 1990 as “young.”     
Table II reports summary statistics for both the full sample of firms as well as the small and 
large subsamples (statistics for the young/mature subsamples are similar to those for the small/large 
subsamples).  Four facts are worth noting.  First, R&D is a large share of total investment (e.g., in the 
full sample, average R&D and fixed investment ratios are similar).  Second, small firms are more 
R&D intensive than large firms, consistent with a Schumpeterian view of creative destruction 
whereby new entrants use innovation to challenge established incumbents (e.g., Aghion and Howitt 
(1992)).  Third, on average, small-firm R&D is large relative to cash flow, suggesting that small firms 
are likely dependent on external finance.  Finally, external equity issues are a key source of external 
finance for small firms, but not for large firms.  These statistics suggest that access to stock market 
financing may be most important for small firms, as the typical large firm appears much less 
dependent on external finance to fund investment demand. 
[Insert Table II here] 
II. Financial Development and Innovative Investment 
A.  Rajan and Zingales Difference-in-Difference Approach  
To evaluate how cross-country differences in access to external equity affect investment at the 
firm level, we adopt the widely used identification strategy developed by Rajan and Zingales (1998) 
                                                          
10
 The Internet Appendix is available in the online version of this article on the Journal of Finance website.  
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in their seminal study on finance and economic growth.  RZ argue that industries that are 
technologically more dependent on external finance should gain more from financial development 
than industries that require relatively little external finance.  Extending the RZ tests to the firm level, 
we examine how the interaction between an industry’s technological dependence on external finance 
(ExternalDependj) and the country’s overall level of financial development (FinDevelopk) affects 
firm-level investment, after controlling for firm characteristics, industry fixed effects, and country 
fixed effects.
11
 
The main regression is:  
R&Dijk =  + ExternalDependj*FinDevelopk + Xijk + kj + ijk,        (1) 
where R&Dijk is R&D investment by firm i in industry j and country k.  As in RZ, ExternalDependj is 
industry j’s dependence on external finance, computed as the difference between investment spending 
and cash generated from operations for the median firm in each two-digit SIC industry in the U.S. 
over the period 1990 to 2007.
12
  This approach assumes that publicly traded U.S. firms face relatively 
frictionless capital markets and their use of external finance is therefore driven primarily by 
technological demand.  The second component of the interaction term, FinDevelopk, is the access 
firms in country k have to external finance using the various measures of financial development 
                                                          
11
 In the initial version of the paper our empirical tests were based on the cross-sectional connection between 
firm-level investment and firm-level stock issues, using legal origins and the strength of investor protections at 
the country level to instrument for firm-level use of external equity finance. We briefly discuss the results from 
this approach in Section III. We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting that we use the RZ approach. In a 
contemporaneous working paper, Pienknagura (2010) uses an approach similar to equation (1) to examine the 
connection between financial development and firm growth and R&D, but his focus and key conclusions are 
much different than ours. 
12
 All of our findings are unchanged (and our most important results are even stronger) if we use U.S. data from 
the 1980s to compute ExternalDependj.  Our measure follows RZ in all details except that we scale firm-level 
dependence on external finance by total investment (R&D plus fixed investment) rather than just fixed 
investment. Our measure is arguably an improvement on the standard RZ measure, at least in studies that 
examine industries in which R&D comprises a substantial share of total investment. The numerator of the RZ 
measure of financial dependence is fixed investment less cash from operations.  But since R&D is expensed 
(and thus reduces cash from operations dollar for dollar), the numerator is effectively fixed investment plus 
R&D less cash from operations gross of R&D investment.  For our purposes, it thus makes sense to scale by 
fixed investment plus R&D, as this reflects the true total investment that must be financed. To not do so would 
overstate the degree of external dependence in precisely the industries that are most R&D intensive.  
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discussed in Section I.  In addition, Xijk is a vector of firm-specific control variables: age, internally 
generated cash flow, sales, and sales growth.  All firm-level variables except age and sales growth are 
scaled by the book value of total assets.  The specification includes both country fixed effects (k)and 
industry fixed effectsj).  Notably, the country fixed effects control for any time-invariant country-
specific factors that affect firm-level R&D investment through nonfinancial channels, such as the 
extent of intellectual property protection or the appetite for risk taking.   
 If access to external equity finance matters for R&D investment, as we have argued, then the 
logic of RZ suggests that better access to stock market financing will have the strongest effect on 
R&D investment in firms located in industries with a relatively high technological demand for 
external finance.  Thus, our main empirical prediction is a positive and economically substantial 
estimate of  in equation (1) when FinDevelopk reflects the access that firms in a given country have 
to stock market funding.   In contrast, we expect   0 when the financial development measures 
reflect access to debt finance, given the theoretical arguments and empirical evidence suggesting that 
debt is poorly suited to financing risky, intangible investments like R&D.
13
 
B. Baseline Results for R&D 
Table III reports OLS estimates of  in equation (1) using the five alternative measures of 
financial development discussed above.  Standard errors robust to clustering at the country level are 
reported in parentheses.  We start in the first column with our preferred measure of stock market 
access based on actual stock issues in each country (Country equity issues).  The coefficient estimate 
on the interaction between industry dependence on external finance and country equity issues is 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating that better access to stock market 
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 Alternative measures of financial development tend to be positively correlated across countries, particularly 
broad measures of stock market capitalization and credit market depth.  As a consequence, it is possible that 
some studies using broad measures of credit market depth will find  > 0, even if our insights on the difficulty 
of using debt to fund R&D are correct. It is thus potentially difficult to use broad development measures to 
make inferences about the importance of access to a particular type of finance for investment and growth.           
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financing has a relatively stronger positive effect on R&D intensity in firms located in industries that 
are relatively more dependent on external finance.     
To evaluate the quantitative magnitude of the coefficient estimate, we follow RZ and compute 
a “differential in R&D intensity” by comparing the difference in predicted R&D intensity in high- and 
low-financially dependent industries across countries with high and low financial development 
measures.  We report this value in the final row of Table III.  The industry at the 75
th
 percentile of 
financial dependence is Instruments and the industry at the 25
th
 percentile is Textiles.  The country at 
the 75
th
 percentile of financial development (based on Country equity issues) is the Netherlands and at 
the 25
th
 percentile is South Africa.  The estimate in column (1) of Table III predicts that, on average, 
long-run R&D intensity for firms in the Instruments industry should be 0.015 higher than R&D 
intensity for firms in the Textiles industry in a high stock issue country such as the Netherlands, as 
compared to a low stock issue country such as South Africa.  This predicted differential effect is 
approximately 30% of the average R&D intensity in the overall sample, suggesting a quantitatively 
important impact. 
In the next two columns of Table III we examine alternative measures of stock market 
development and access.  The results for Accounting standards are reported in column (2): the 
interaction coefficient is positive and significant at the 1% level and the differential in R&D intensity 
(0.014) is very similar to the results using Country equity issues.  In column (3) we report results for 
IPOs/GDP and again find a positive, significant, and economically substantial coefficient on the key 
interaction term.  Finally, columns (4) and (5) report results using the proxies for access to credit 
markets (Country-weighted leverage and Credit/GDP).  As expected, the findings differ markedly 
from the results using measures of stock market access.  In particular, the coefficient estimates on the 
key interaction term are negative (though statistically insignificant), indicating that credit market 
access has no impact on R&D intensity across high- and low-financially dependent industries. 
[Insert Table III here] 
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Given the importance of the connection between access to stock market financing and R&D 
for our study, we also estimate equation (1) using a number of alternative measures of stock market 
access and development.  These results are presented in the Internet Appendix.  Notably, we obtain 
very similar results to those reported in Table III if we use: i) a measure of Country equity issues 
constructed from stock issues by small firms only, ii) the number of domestic listed firms relative to 
the overall population (used by LLSV (1997) and LLS (2006)), iii) the “access to equity” index 
developed by Schwab et al. (1999), or iv) the ratio of total market capitalization held by small 
investors scaled by GDP (used by LLS (2006)).  As mentioned above, we get weaker results using the 
overall stock market capitalization-to-GDP ratio (MCAP/GDP), likely because it is a relatively poor 
measure of the access listed firms have to the actual funding available from domestic stock markets. 
C. Legal Rules and Institutions as Instruments  
In Table IV we follow an extensive literature and rely on predetermined legal variables as 
instruments for the stock market development measures.  The legal system is an important 
determinant of cross-country differences in access to external finance (e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (2002), Beck and Levine (2005), and LLS (2008)) and, of particular relevance for our 
study, the evidence in LLSV (1997) suggests that legal investor protections matter much more for 
access to external equity finance than for access to debt finance (e.g., see Tables IV to VI compared to 
Table VII in LLSV (1997)).  In column (1) we report two-stage least squares (IV) estimates of 
equation (1) using a dummy variable equal to one if a country is of common law legal origin (Legal 
origin) to instrument for Country equity issues.  Legal origin is widely used to instrument for financial 
development because it is arguably exogenous to contemporary economic and financial 
development.
14
  The IV estimate on the key interaction term is statistically significant at the 5% level 
and the magnitude (0.359) is only slightly smaller than the corresponding OLS estimate in Table III.  
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 Studies using legal origin to instrument for financial development include Rajan and Zingales (1998), Levine 
(1998, 1999), Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000), Beck and Levine (2002), Carlin and Mayer (2003), Rossi and 
Volpin (2004), Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), Aghion, Howitt, and Mayer-Foulkes (2005), and Larraín (2010). 
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In column (2) we replace Legal origin with an index from Djankov et al. (DLLS, 2008) measuring the 
extent to which contracts are enforced (Enforcement) and find an even stronger effect of stock market 
access on firm-level R&D.  In column (3) we use both Legal origin and Enforcement as instruments, 
similar to the IV approach in RZ; the point estimate of 0.444 is statistically significant at the 1% level 
and very similar in both magnitude and precision to the corresponding OLS estimate in Table III.  In 
column (4), we replace Legal origin with the shareholder protection measure that DLLS (2008) 
develop to measure the legal protection of minority investors against self-dealing and expropriation by 
corporate insiders (ASD).  Using ASD and Enforcement as instruments also returns a point estimate 
similar to the corresponding OLS estimate in Table III.   Finally, in columns (5) and (6) we use Legal 
origin and Enforcement to instrument for Accounting standards and IPOs/GDP, respectively.  The 
estimated coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% level or better and are somewhat larger 
than the corresponding point estimates in Table III. 
Overall, the IV results in Table IV support the baseline results in Table III indicating that 
access to stock market financing has an economically important effect on innovative investment at the 
firm level.  In addition to dealing with the potential endogeneity of the stock market measures, these 
results highlight a causal mechanism through which legal institutions can affect important real 
economic activities, a point we return to in Sections III and IV. 
[Insert Table IV here] 
D. R&D Results across Firm Types 
We expect access to stock market financing to matter most for R&D investment in firms that 
depend most on external finance to fund investment demand.  We test this by estimating  in equation 
(1) separately for groups of firms sorted based on both size and age.  We report separate results for 
subsamples of small and large firms in Panel A of Table V, and separate results for young and mature 
firms in Panel B.   In the first six columns we report OLS results for our three main measures of stock 
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market access (Country equity issues, Accounting standards, and IPOs/GDP), and in the final two 
columns we report IV results where Legal origin and Enforcement are used to instrument for Country 
equity issues.  In each case, the key interaction term is positive and statistically significant in the 
small- and young-firm subsamples.  Furthermore, the predicted R&D differentials are substantial:  for 
example, using the OLS estimate for Country equity issues in column (1), the predicted R&D intensity 
for small firms in the Instruments industry is 0.022 higher than small-firm R&D intensity in Textiles 
in the Netherlands as compared to South Africa.  In contrast, for the large- and mature-firm 
subsamples, the estimates of are quantitatively small and generally statistically insignificant (the 
lone exception being the IV estimate for mature firms in the final column).  Furthermore, in all cases 
the estimates of  are statistically different across the small/young and large/mature subsamples.  
These results increase confidence in our empirical approach because we find significant financial 
effects in the groups of firms that should be especially sensitive to stock market access. 
[Insert Table V here] 
E.  Alternative Samples and Approaches 
We find similar results using a number of alternative sampling and estimation approaches.  
We report the most important robustness checks in Table VI.  For all of these checks we report OLS 
estimates using the Country equity issues measure of stock market access.  First, column (1) reports 
results using an alternative measure of industry-level dependence on external finance: we compute 
financial dependence using only U.S. firms that are within 10 years since they first appear in 
Compustat.  As the estimates show, we continue to find a positive and significant coefficient on the 
key interaction term, and the predicted R&D differential is quantitatively large and consistent with our 
baseline estimates in Table III.  Similarly, in the Internet Appendix we show that our findings are also 
robust to computing the industry dependence measures using U.S. data from the 1980s, the decade 
preceding the start of our sample.  Second, in column (2) we drop the restriction that firms must report 
R&D investment to be included in the sample by setting R&D to zero for any firm that never reports 
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information on R&D expenditures (which sharply increases the number of observations).  The 
estimates show a positive and significant coefficient on the key interaction term.  Notice that although 
the absolute size of the R&D differential (0.005) in column (2) is considerably smaller than the 
figures reported above, the magnitude of this predicted differential remains substantial when 
evaluated relative to the new sample average, which falls by almost 60% (to 0.022) when we set 
missing R&D to zero. In columns (3) and (4) we exclude countries that contribute fewer than 50 firms 
(roughly the median number across countries in our sample) and continue to find positive, significant, 
and economically substantial results for small firms only.  The main reason for this robustness test is 
to ensure that we have sufficient within-country variation across high- and low-dependence industries 
to obtain relatively precise coefficient estimates in both the small- and large-firm subsamples.  
Similarly, dropping the countries that contribute the largest number of firms to the sample – Canada, 
Japan, and the UK – reduces the sample size considerably but has no impact on our key findings for 
small and large firms (columns (5) and (6)).  
[Insert Table VI here] 
F. Fixed Investment, Intangible Assets, and Firm Growth 
We now turn to three extensions of our main results.  First, we expect the availability of stock 
market financing to have a much smaller quantitative impact on fixed investment than on R&D since 
firms should be better able to substitute debt for equity when it comes to funding investment in 
tangible fixed assets.  In Table VII we report estimates of equation (1) with fixed investment replacing 
R&D as the dependent variable.  Consistent with our priors, the interaction between industry external 
finance dependence and stock market access is quantitatively small (and actually slightly negative) for 
all three stock market measures (columns (1) to (3)).  In contrast, the key interaction term is positive 
for both credit market measures (columns (4) and (5)), although only the Country-weighted leverage 
measure in column (4) is statistically significant.  The results using Country-weighted leverage 
indicate that fixed capital investment for firms in the Instruments industry should be approximately 
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0.002 higher than fixed investment for firms in the Textiles industry in a high-leverage country such 
as Japan compared to a low-leverage country such as Israel.  This predicted differential is around 4% 
of the sample average fixed investment intensity, suggesting that credit market access has a positive 
but relatively modest effect on fixed investment levels.
15
  
[Insert Table VII here] 
Second, our insights on the particular importance of stock market access for R&D investment 
should apply to other intangible assets within the firm that lack collateral value and therefore are 
likely difficult to finance with debt.  We thus reestimate equation (1) with the firm-level ratio of 
intangible assets-to-net fixed assets replacing R&D as the dependent variable.  Using the Country 
equity issues measure of stock market access, we report separate results for subsamples of small and 
large firms in the first two columns of Table VIII.  The estimates show a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient on the key interaction term in the small-firm subsample, but a small and 
statistically insignificant estimate for large firms.  Furthermore, the predicted small-firm intangible 
intensity differential is around 0.279, or roughly 20% of the sample average.  We obtain similar 
results with the other measures of stock market access (see the Internet Appendix).  Thus, the overall 
results for intangible asset intensity are very similar to the results for R&D.
16
    
Finally, since R&D is a key input for growth, our findings connecting R&D and access to 
stock market financing suggest that better access to stock markets should be associated with faster 
                                                          
15
 We examine the results for fixed investment using broader samples of firms and obtain similar results.  These 
results are reported in the Internet Appendix.  If we expand the sample to include Compustat firms that do not 
report R&D, we get positive and statistically significant coefficients using some measures of financial 
development (e.g., Country equity issues, Country weighted leverage, and Credit/GDP), but the economic 
significance of the estimates is always very small. For example, the predicted differentials in fixed investment 
intensity are between 2% and 6% of the sample average, whereas the differentials for R&D are in the 25% to 
30% range. 
16
 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting that we examine both intangible asset intensity and firm 
growth rates. In contrast to R&D, which is a flow of new intangible investment spending, the stock of intangible 
assets is taken from the balance sheet and includes things like blueprints, patents, copyrights, client lists, and 
goodwill.  Our measure of intangible asset intensity follows Claessens and Laeven (2003).  We get similar 
results if we subtract goodwill from intangible assets before scaling by net fixed assets (see the Internet 
Appendix).          
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rates of firm growth, particularly in smaller and younger firms.  We report direct evidence of such a 
connection in the final four columns of Table VIII.  In columns (3) and (4) we examine the relation 
between Country equity issues and firm-level value-added growth (Value-added growth); in columns 
(5) and (6) we replace value-added growth with a proxy for growth in firm-level productivity 
(Productivity growth).
17
  We again report separate results for small and large firms.  In each case, 
Country equity issues shares a strong positive connection with value-added and productivity growth, 
but only among small firms.  In the Internet Appendix we show that the results are similar if we 
measure stock market access with Accounting standards or IPOs/GDP instead of Country equity 
issues.  Thus, we find direct evidence that access to stock market financing is associated with small-
firm growth, consistent with the evidence we present linking stock markets with R&D investment and 
the accumulation of intangible assets.  
There are reasons to expect that our results understate the full effect of stock markets on firm 
growth.  For one, the spillovers associated with innovative investment can be substantial (e.g., Jones 
and Williams (1998)), in which case the relatively higher rates of R&D investment by firms in 
financially dependent industries can foster growth in firms located in other sectors of the economy.  If 
so, our evidence above on the differential effects on firm growth across high- and low-dependence 
sectors will understate the importance of stock market access for firm-level growth.  In addition, our 
sample is (necessarily) comprised entirely of listed firms, and better access to external finance may 
have even stronger effects on investment and growth in unlisted firms.  Thus, our findings suggest a 
substantial connection between stock market access and firm growth rates, consistent with the strong 
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 Value-added growth is measured as the log change in the sum of operating income plus labor expense and 
necessarily excludes observations (and some firms) with negative value-added totals.  Productivity growth is 
computed as revenue growth - 0.3*growth in fixed assets - 0.7*growth in labor inputs (employees).  In the 
Internet Appendix we show that we get similar results if we measure Productivity growth as either revenue 
growth - 0.2*growth in fixed assets - 0.8*growth in labor inputs, or revenue growth - 0.4*growth in fixed assets 
- 0.6*growth in labor inputs.  As with the other firm-level variables, the growth measures are firm averages over 
the full sample period. The growth regressions include firm-level controls for age (number of years in 
Compustat) and initial size (log of total employment from the first year the firm appears in the sample), as well 
as industry and country fixed effects. 
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connection between finance and growth at the industry- and economy-wide levels documented in RZ 
and many other studies (e.g., Levine (2005)). 
[Insert Table VIII here] 
Together with the findings for R&D, the results in Tables VII and VIII yield several new 
insights on the effects financial development has on real economic activity and the causal channels 
through which finance fosters growth.  In particular, our estimates indicate that innovative and 
intangible investments are much more sensitive to financial development than is firm investment in 
fixed capital.  These results are consistent with the idea that firms have multiple options for financing 
fixed investment, making it less dependent on financial market development in general and stock 
market development in particular.
18
  Furthermore, since access to stock market financing is positively 
associated with R&D, intangible assets, and firm growth rates, but not with fixed capital investment, 
these results suggest that access to stock market financing is especially important in situations in 
which growth is driven primarily by innovative and other intangible investments.       
III. Additional Tests: Legal Rules and Financing R&D at the Firm Level 
Our findings support the idea that legal rules and financial developments affecting the long-
run supply of external equity finance have a substantial impact on firm R&D investment.  To further 
evaluate this ‘financing R&D’ channel, we now turn to some additional evidence connecting law and 
the financing of R&D at the firm level.
19
      
A. Law and Firm Stock Issues 
If the causal channel we have emphasized is truly operational, we should observe more firm-
level use of external equity finance when investor protections are strong and stock market funding is 
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 These findings are also consistent with the findings on aggregate capital spending in Acemoglu and Johnson 
(2005), as well as existing evidence on the impact that financial development has on economy-wide physical 
capital accumulation (see the discussion in Levine (2005)). 
19
 We thank the associate editor for encouraging us to explore these additional implications.  
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widely available.  Further, this reliance on stock markets for funding should be most pronounced in 
smaller and younger firms that cannot fully fund investment demand with internal cash flow.  As 
discussed above, many studies present evidence connecting legal rules with broad measures of stock 
market development (e.g., LLS (2006)), but there is much less evidence directly connecting legal 
investor protections with the use of external equity at the firm level.  To test this potential connection, 
we estimate the following specification:     
Stock issuesijk =  + InvestorProtectionk + Xijk + 3Ykj + ijk.                             (2) 
Here, Stock issuesijk is the net issues of new external equity for firm i in industry j and country 
k.  To measure InvestorProtectionk we focus on both a country’s legal origin (Legal origin) and the 
anti-self dealing index (ASD). In addition, Xijk is the set of firm-level controls (age, sales, sales 
growth, and cash flow) used in equation (1) and Yk is a vector of country-level controls used in a 
number of other studies on financial development and growth (e.g., Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad 
(2005)).
20
  Finally, j is an industry-specific fixed effect (defined at the two-digit SIC level) and ijk is 
a random error term.   
 Panel A in Table IX contains OLS estimates of equation (2).  The results in the first column 
show that the use of external equity across all firms in our sample is significantly higher in countries 
with higher anti-self dealing measures (ASD), after controlling for the firm, country, and industry 
characteristics noted above.  Further, estimating equation (2) separately for small and large firms 
shows that the quality of investor protections is a particularly important determinant of stock issues by 
small firms.  For example, the coefficient estimate on ASD in the small-firm regression (column (2)) 
is 0.129, which indicates that, all else equal, moving from a country with an ASD value at the 25
th
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 Specifically, the controls include the natural log of GDP per capita, the average rate of GDP growth during 
the sample period, a measure of country-specific global growth opportunities from Bekaert et al. (2007), the 
ratio of government expenditures to GDP, the share of the population enrolled in secondary education, an index 
of creditor rights following LLSV (1998), the inflation rate, and a rating of private property protections from 
Claessens and Laeven (2003). 
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percentile (Spain) to a country at the 75
th
 percentile (Israel) increases the small-firm stock issues ratio 
by 0.044 (0.129*0.34).  This effect is economically substantial (approximately 50% of the sample 
average for small firms).  Furthermore, it suggests that stronger legal investor protections lead to 
greater reliance on stock markets for funding, which is a different benefit of stock market access than 
is typically emphasized in the literature.  In columns (4) to (6) we measure investor protections with 
Legal origin rather than ASD and get very similar results.   
[Insert Table IX here] 
B. Law, Internal and External Finance, and R&D 
 The channel we emphasize requires that firms use the new equity issues examined in Panel A 
of Table IX to fund R&D.  We directly test this idea by exploring the association between R&D 
investment and actual use of external equity financing across firms.  Specifically, we regress firm 
R&D on the firm-level equity issues measure examined in equation (2).  We include the same firm 
and country controls noted above and we use the country measures of legal investor protection to 
instrument for firm stock issues, which are clearly endogenous (thus, the regressions reported in Panel 
A are the “first stage” results in this two-stage (2SLS) regression).  The results, which are reported in 
the Internet Appendix, show a very strong connection between R&D and firm-level equity issues in 
subsamples of small and young firms, but not large and mature firms.  These findings indicate that 
cross-firm differences in external equity issues, caused by differences in legal investor protections 
across countries, have a substantial impact on long-run levels of small-firm R&D investment.  These 
results support our emphasis on the importance of external equity for funding innovative investment 
and complement our main findings (from the RZ approach) linking country-level measures of stock 
market access with firm-level R&D.
21
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 When we repeat this exercise for fixed investment the IV estimates on firm-level stock issues are negative but 
statistically insignificant.  The results are reported in the Internet Appendix.   
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 Given the importance of legal rules for firm access to stock market financing, and the 
difficulties firms should have financing R&D with debt, the evidence presented thus far suggests that 
financing constraints on R&D should be particularly tight whenever investor protections are weak and 
access to external equity is limited.  If so, we expect firm R&D investment to be more dependent on 
internally generated funds whenever shareholder protections are weak.  To test this implication, we 
compute the average (long-run) ratio of R&D to cash flow (R&D/cash flow) for all firms in our 
sample, and regress this ratio against investor protections and the country and firm controls used 
above (except, of course, we no longer control for internal cash flow).  The results are reported in 
Panel B of Table IX.  The first three columns show that the firm-level R&D-to-cash flow ratio is 
significantly higher in countries with higher anti-self dealing measures, countries with common law 
legal origins, and countries with higher levels of Country equity issues, indicating that R&D 
investment is less closely tied to internal funds for firms located in countries with strong investor 
protections and better availability of stock market financing.  The results in column (4) show that 
when both investor protections and Country equity issues are included in the specification, only 
Country equity issues shares a positive relation with R&D/cash flow.  This finding suggests that legal 
investor protections matter for R&D via the impact they have on the availability of external equity 
financing.  Columns (5) and (6) show that the positive connection between investor protections and 
R&D/cash flow is driven entirely by small firms, as large firms tend to have slightly lower R&D/cash 
flow ratios when investor protections are strong.  These very different results for small and large firms 
suggest that strong investor protections can be valuable not only because, as we have emphasized, 
they allow otherwise constrained firms to increase R&D investment, but also because they constrain 
overinvestment by larger firms with ample free cash flow, thereby enhancing the efficiency of firm-
level innovative investment.
22
  Finally, we show in the Internet Appendix that the long-run ratio of 
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 Xiao (2011) examines this potential in more detail and finds strong evidence that shareholder protections 
improve the efficiency of R&D investment.  
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fixed investment to cash flow is unrelated to the strength of legal investor protections, supporting our 
earlier evidence showing that fixed investment levels are much less sensitive to the availability of 
external equity finance. 
IV.  Conclusions and Implications 
We examine the causal connections between a country’s legal system, the access firms have 
to stock market financing, and innovative investment at the firm level.  We find that better access to 
stock market financing has a substantial positive effect on long-run levels of firm investment in R&D 
but no effect on firm investment in fixed capital.  The availability of external equity is particularly 
important for R&D investment in smaller and younger firms.  In contrast, credit market access is 
unimportant for firm rates of R&D investment.  Further, our evidence indicates that the legal rules and 
institutions driving cross-country differences in stock market access matter a great deal for innovative 
activity and have an important impact on the way that R&D investment is financed at the firm level.  
The underlying logic for this full set of findings is that debt is poorly suited to finance risky, 
intangible investments.  Thus, when it comes to funding R&D, firms cannot easily substitute debt for 
any lack of external equity caused by weak shareholder protections and underdeveloped stock 
markets.  Our study has implications for a number of important literatures, and highlights several 
areas for further research.  
A.  What Connects Finance and Growth? 
 In his review of the finance and growth literature, Levine (2005) emphasizes that physical 
investment does not appear to be important for understanding the finance-growth nexus, but rather 
what is required are “theories that describe how financial development influences resource allocation 
decisions in ways that foster productivity growth….” Of particular relevance to our study, there is 
strong evidence that the causal connections between stock markets and growth work through 
productivity growth rather than physical capital accumulation (e.g., Levine (2005) and Bekaert, 
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Harvey, and Lundblad (2011)).  Our study contributes to this literature by documenting a micro-level 
channel through which stock market developments can cause growth by supplying critical funds for 
productivity-enhancing R&D investments.  In addition, these findings can help explain why stock 
market liberalization appears to have a long-lasting impact on growth rates (e.g., Bekaert, Harvey, and 
Lundblad (2005, 2011)):  since liberalizations should lead to a permanent increase in the availability 
of external finance, our estimates suggest that liberalizations can bring about a long-lasting increase in 
firm-level rates of R&D, innovation, and productivity.   
Our findings are also relevant for endogenous growth theory, particularly the Schumpeterian 
growth literature that emphasizes the entry of innovators with better products and technologies (e.g., 
see Aghion and Howitt (1992, 2006)).  It is natural to think of the small (and young) firms in our 
study as innovative entrants.  Our findings for these firms suggest that stock market financing should 
be an important determinant of their ability to produce the superior technologies and products key to 
the Schumpeterian paradigm.       
B. Legal Systems and Real Activity  
Extensive evidence shows that a country’s legal rules and the strength of its “contracting 
institutions” affect the nature and extent of its financial market development (e.g., LLSV (1997, 1998) 
and LLS (2006)).  However, as LLS (2008) note, it has been difficult to “take the next step” and link 
law with aggregate economic performance.  Our study highlights a potential next step by linking legal 
institutions with real activities that drive innovation and economic growth.  In doing so, our results 
provide an important counterexample to Acemoglu and Johnson’s (2005) argument that contracting 
institutions “may have limited effects on real activity because agents can use debt to contract around 
poor legal rules.”  While their argument may hold for fixed investment (the investment that they and 
most other studies focus on), our findings suggest that contracting institutions matter a great deal 
when it comes to funding innovation, as firms seeking to fund R&D likely have considerable 
difficulty substituting debt for equity. 
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C.  Does Financial Development Matter More for Small Firms? 
Beck et al. (2008) describe the debate surrounding whether financial development 
disproportionately helps small or large firms.  They find that industries with a larger share of small 
firms (for technological reasons) grow faster in economies with well-developed financial systems.  
Our study contributes to this debate by showing that access to stock market financing matters much 
more for the R&D investment of small firms compared to large firms.  Given our results, together 
with the findings in Beck et al. (2008) and related studies (e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(1998), Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2005)), it appears that the preponderance of 
evidence points to financial development disproportionately impacting small firms. 
D.  Does Financial Architecture Matter? 
Holding constant the overall level of financial development, the prevailing view appears to be 
that whether a country is bank- or market-based does not have a substantial impact on the real side of 
the economy (e.g., see the review in Levine (2005)).  Our research identifies an unexplored channel 
through which the structure of financial markets can matter: market-based financial systems should 
have a clear advantage in funding innovative activity, particularly for smaller and younger firms most 
dependent on external finance.  Small firms in countries like the U.S. contribute a large share of total 
R&D and there is evidence that their R&D is much more productive than the R&D of larger firms.  
For example, Acs and Audretsch (1988) show that small firms have rates of innovation per employee 
that are far greater (i.e., 6.64 times) than those of large firms in the innovative industries in their 
sample.  Furthermore, small firms, relying heavily on external equity finance, appear to be 
particularly important for creative destruction (e.g., Brown and Petersen (2010) and Liang, McLean, 
and Zhao (2011)).  Thus, our evidence linking stock markets and R&D across countries suggests that 
market-based systems may have a significant advantage in generating growth through a process of 
creative destruction driven by the innovation of young and small firms.  This advantage should be 
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most pronounced in the stage of economic development where growth is driven primarily by creating 
and adopting new knowledge rather than investing in physical capital.  More research is required to 
determine whether in fact financial architecture affects growth in such an environment. 
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Appendix: Country Characteristics 
Table AI 
 
This table reports firm counts and investor protection and financial development measures for all sampled 
countries.  All variables and data sources are listed in Table I. 
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Australia 188 Common 0.79 9.36 0.197 75 0.087 0.280 0.793 
Austria 29 Civil 0.21 9.80 0.037 54 0.012 0.287 0.979 
Belgium 39 Civil 0.54 9.74 0.088 61 0.024 0.276 0.693 
Brazil 24 Civil 0.29 6.31 0.007 54 0.001 0.199 0.327 
Canada 484 Common 0.65 9.48 0.175 74 0.086 0.272 0.933 
Chile 12 Civil 0.63 6.91 0.013 52 0.005 0.235 0.534 
Denmark 41 Civil 0.47 9.66 0.117 62 0.012 0.240 0.864 
Finland 83 Civil 0.46 9.58 0.029 77 0.038 0.282 0.673 
France 169 Civil 0.38 9.09 0.045 69 0.023 0.257 0.885 
Germany 250 Civil 0.28 9.50 0.075 62 0.028 0.263 1.072 
Greece 51 Civil 0.23 6.40 0.014 55 0.088 0.274 0.454 
Hong Kong 53 Common 0.96 n/a 0.105 69 0.091 0.190 1.457 
India 243 Common 0.55 5.14 0.026 57 0.006 0.217 0.275 
Indonesia 17 Civil 0.68 n/a 0.031 n/a 0.017 0.304 0.344 
Ireland 36 Common 0.79 8.38 0.112 n/a 0.061 0.287 0.896 
Israel 130 Common 0.71 6.18 0.132 64 0.004 0.222 0.703 
Italy 32 Civil 0.39 8.75 0.045 62 0.059 0.338 0.680 
Japan 2167 Civil 0.48 9.34 0.013 65 0.024 0.284 1.540 
Korea 19 Civil 0.46 6.97 0.063 62 0.053 0.317 0.680 
Malaysia 83 Common 0.95 7.11 0.050 76 0.062 0.268 1.112 
Netherlands 70 Civil 0.21 9.68 0.096 64 0.026 0.209 1.179 
New Zealand 13 Common 0.95 9.65 0.054 70 0.001 0.335 1.019 
Norway 43 Civil 0.44 9.86 0.096 74 0.022 0.232 0.641 
Pakistan 13 Common 0.41 3.95 0.000 n/a 0.004 0.185 0.233 
Philippines 17 Civil 0.24 3.77 0.015 65 0.022 0.166 0.306 
Singapore 73 Common 1.00 n/a 0.051 78 0.059 0.278 0.935 
South Africa 45 Common 0.81 5.85 0.019 70 0.007 0.168 0.618 
Spain 11 Civil 0.37 8.10 0.008 64 0.024 0.362 0.956 
Sweden 133 Civil 0.34 9.79 0.108 83 0.063 0.231 0.640 
Switzerland 107 Civil 0.27 9.99 0.048 68 0.071 0.237 1.592 
Turkey 43 Civil 0.43 n/a 0.009 51 0.015 0.251 0.155 
United 
Kingdom 
643 Common 0.93 9.10 0.133 78 0.113 0.206 1.254 
Mean   0.54 8.12 0.063 66 0.038 0.255 0.795 
Median   0.47 9.09 0.049 65 0.024 0.260 0.748 
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Table I 
Description of the Variables 
 
Variable Description 
Firm and industry variables 
R&D R&D is the firm average of R&D scaled by the book value of total assets over the period 1990 to 2007. Firm-year 
observations are Winsorized at the 1% level prior to computing the average. Data are from Compustat Global and North 
America. 
Fixed investment Fixed investment is the firm average of fixed investment scaled by the book value of total assets over the period 1990 to 
2007. Firm-year observations are Winsorized at the 1% level prior to computing the average. Data are from Compustat 
Global and North America. 
Intangible assets Intangible assets is the firm average of the stock of intangible assets scaled by the book value of net fixed assets over the 
period 1990 to 2007. Firm-year observations are Winsorized at the 1% level prior to computing the average. Data are from 
Compustat Global and North America. 
Value-added growth Valued-added growth is the firm average of the annual log change in the sum of operating income plus labor expenses over 
the period 1990 to 2007. Firm-year observations are Winsorized at the 1% level prior to computing the average. Data are 
from Compustat Global and North America. 
Productivity growth Productivity growth is the firm average of revenue growth minus 0.3*growth in fixed assets minus 0.7*growth in 
employment over the period 1990 to 2007. Firm-year observations are Winsorized at the 1% level prior to computing the 
average. Data are from Compustat Global and North America. 
Cash flow Cash flow is the firm average of cash flow scaled by the book value of total assets over the period 1990 to 2007.  Cash flow 
is measured as after-tax income before extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization plus research and 
development expense. Firm-year observations are Winsorized at the 1% level prior to computing the average. Data are from 
Compustat Global and North America. 
Stock issues Stock issues is the firm average of net equity issues scaled by the book value of total assets over the period 1990 to 2007. 
Net equity issues is equal to the sale of common and preferred stock minus the purchase of common and preferred stock. 
Firm-year observations are Winsorized at the 1% level prior to computing the average. Data are from Compustat Global and 
North America. 
Sales Sales is the firm average of net sales scaled by the book value of total assets over the period 1990 to 2007. Firm-year 
observations are Winsorized at the 1% level prior to computing the average. Data are from Compustat Global and North 
America. 
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Table I (Continued) 
Variable Description 
Sales growth Sales growth is the firm average of the annual log change in net sales over the period 1990 to 2007. Firm-year observations 
are Winsorized at the 1% level prior to computing the average. Data are from Compustat Global and North America. 
Employment Employment is the firm average number of employees over the period 1990 to 2007.  Data are from Compustat Global and 
North America. 
ExternalDepend Industry-level dependence on external finance is fixed investment minus cash from operations divided by fixed investment 
plus R&D for the median U.S. firm in each two-digit SIC industry.  Both reliance on external finance (fixed investment 
minus cash from operations) and total investment (fixed investment plus R&D) are summed over 1990 to 2007 for each firm 
before dividing.  Data are from Compustat North America.  
Law and finance variables 
Legal origin A dummy variable equal to one if the country is of common law legal origin. From La Porta et al. (1997). 
Anti-self dealing index (ASD) A measure of legal protection of minority shareholders against expropriation by corporate insiders in 2003, scaled between 
zero and one (Djankov et al. (2008)). From La Porta's webpage: 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/rafael.laporta/publications.html. 
Enforcement Enforceability of contracts. The relative degree to which contractual agreements are honored. Scaled from zero to 10 with 
higher scores indicating higher enforceability (Djankov et al. (2003)). From La Porta's webpage (see above). 
Country equity issues The country average of the firm-level variable Stock issues. See above. 
Accounting standards Index of the comprehensiveness of corporate annual reports in 1990 developed by the Center for International Financial 
Analysis and Research, scaled between zero and 90, with higher values indicating stronger standards. From Levine (1999). 
IPOs/GDP Value of IPOs over GDP. Averaged over 1996 to 2000. From La Porta's webpage (see above). 
Country-weighted leverage Value-weighted average debt-to-assets ratio across all sampled firms in a given country. Data are from Compustat Global 
and North America. 
Credit/GDP Private credit by deposit money banks to GDP. Averaged over the period 1990 to 2007. Data are from the World Bank's 
Financial Development and Structure Database (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2000) and Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt 
(2009)). 
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Table II 
Sample Characteristics 
 
The firm-level data are from Compustat Global and North America and consist of R&D reporting 
firms with at least three nonmissing R&D observations during 1990 to 2007. Firms with a primary 
industry classification in financials (SIC 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC 4900-4999) are excluded. All 
firm-level variables are averages over the full sample period.  Firms are classified as small if their 
average employment during the sample period is in the bottom 70
th
 percentile of all sampled firms and 
large otherwise. All variables except Employment are scaled by the book value of total assets. 
 
 
R&D 
Fixed 
investment 
Cash flow Equity issues Employment 
 
All firms 
Mean 0.053 0.048 0.064 0.065 5933 
Median 0.018 0.038 0.080 0.005 871 
Std dev 0.089 0.038 0.140 0.145 20443 
Small firms 
Mean 0.066 0.044 0.048 0.088 640 
Median 0.022 0.033 0.067 0.010 451 
Std dev 0.101 0.038 0.159 0.167 586 
Large firms 
Mean 0.024 0.056 0.104 0.012 18145 
Median 0.013 0.050 0.097 0.001 6993 
Std dev 0.036 0.035 0.066 0.032 34176 
      
Tests of difference 
in means (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Table III 
Firm-Level R&D Investment and Access to External Finance 
 
Table III reports OLS regressions with firm-level R&D to assets as the dependent variable. The firm-
level data are from Compustat Global and North America and consist of R&D reporting firms with at 
least three nonmissing R&D observations during 1990 to 2007. All firm-level variables are averages 
over the full sample period. Firms with a primary industry classification in financials (SIC 6000-6999) 
and utilities (SIC 4900-4999) are excluded. The key independent variable is the interaction between 
industry-level dependence on external funds (ExternalDepend) and country-level measures of access 
to external finance. All regressions include firm-level control variables (age, cash flow, sales, and 
sales growth) as well as country and industry fixed effects.  Detailed variable definitions are provided 
in Table I.  The differential in R&D intensity measures the difference in R&D/assets in an industry at 
the 75
th
 percentile of external dependence relative to an industry at the 25
th
 percentile in a country at 
the 75
th
 percentile of development versus a county at the 25
th
 percentile.  Standard errors calculated 
with clustering at the country level are in parentheses.  
 
 Financial development measured as 
 Country 
equity issues 
Accounting 
standards 
IPOs/GDP Country- 
weighted 
leverage 
Credit/GDP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
ExternalDepend× 
Country equity issues 
0.413     
(0.097)     
     
ExternalDepend × 
Accounting standards 
 0.253    
 (0.081)    
      
ExternalDepend × 
IPOs/GDP 
  0.454   
  (0.181)   
      
ExternalDepend × 
Country weighted 
leverage 
   -0.063  
   (0.201)  
      
ExternalDepend × 
Credit/GDP 
    -0.011 
    (0.024) 
      
R
2
 0.359 0.352 0.353 0.348 0.348 
Observations 5,310 5,244 5,310 5,310 5,310 
Differential in R&D  0.015 0.014 0.010 -0.002 -0.002 
      
 
  
37 
 
Table IV 
R&D Regressions: Instrument with Legal Rules and Institutions 
 
Table IV reports 2SLS regressions with firm-level R&D to assets as the dependent variable.  The key 
independent variable is the interaction between industry-level dependence on external funds 
(ExternalDepend) and various measures of country-level access to external finance. The instruments 
for country-level access to external equity finance are: a dummy variable indicating common law legal 
origin (Legal origin), an index measuring the enforcement of contracts (Enforcement), and the anti-
self dealing index (ASD). All regressions include firm-level control variables (age, cash flow, sales, 
and sales growth) as well as country and industry fixed effects.  The sample is described in Table II. 
Detailed variable definitions are provided in Table I.  The differential in R&D intensity measure is 
explained in Table III.  Standard errors calculated with clustering at the country level are in 
parentheses.  
 
  Financial development measured as 
 Country equity issues Accounting 
standards  
IPOs/GDP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Instruments: Legal 
origin 
Enforcement Legal origin 
and 
Enforcement 
ASD  
and 
Enforcement 
Legal origin 
and 
Enforcement 
Legal origin 
and 
Enforcement 
       
ExternalDepend × 
Country equity 
issues 
0.359 0.689 0.444 0.445   
(0.162) (0.275) (0.123) (0.177)   
       
ExternalDepend × 
Accounting 
standards 
    0.388  
    (0.161)  
       
ExternalDepend × 
IPOs/GDP 
     0.814 
     (0.386) 
       
R
2
 0.359 0.356 0.361 0.361 0.354 0.352 
Observations 5,310 5,125 5,125 5,125 5,076 5,125 
Differential in 
R&D 
0.013 0.024 0.016 0.016 0.021 0.018 
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Table V 
R&D Regressions: Size and Age Splits 
 
Table V reports OLS and 2SLS regressions for separate samples of small and large firms (Panel A) 
and young and mature firms (Panel B).  Firm-level R&D to assets is the dependent variable. The key 
independent variable is the interaction between industry-level dependence on external funds 
(ExternalDepend) and country-level measures of access to external finance (FinDevelop). All 
regressions include firm-level control variables (age, cash flow, sales, and sales growth) as well as 
country and industry fixed effects. In columns (7) and (8) Legal origin and Enforcement are used as 
instruments for Country equity issues.  The sample is described in Table II. Detailed variable 
definitions are provided in Table I. Firms are classified as small if their average employment during 
the sample period is in the bottom 70
th
 percentile of all sampled firms and large otherwise. Firms that 
first appear in Compustat before 1990 are considered “mature”, and those appearing after 1990 as 
“young”. The differential in R&D intensity measure is explained in Table III. Standard errors 
calculated with clustering at the country level are in parentheses. Superscripts 
a
,
 b
, and 
c
 indicate that 
the coefficient estimate for the small (young) firms is statistically different from the coefficient 
estimate for the large (mature) firms at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
 Financial development measured as 
 Country equity 
issues 
Accounting 
standards 
IPOs/GDP Country equity 
issues  
(IV) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Panel A: Size split 
Firms: Small Large Small Large Small Large Small Large 
         
ExternalDepend 
× FinDevelop 
0.630
a
 0.053 0.339
b
 0.021 0.794
b
 0.073 0.547
a
 0.036 
(0.119) (0.044) (0.150) (0.030) (0.369) (0.057) (0.154) (0.059) 
         
R
2
 0.398 0.433 0.389 0.432 0.391 0.433 0.399 0.437 
Observations 3,689 1,621 3,646 1,598 3,689 1,621 3,583 1,542 
Differential in 
R&D 
0.022 0.002 0.019 0.001 0.018 0.002 0.019 0.001 
 Panel B: Age split 
Firms: Young Mature Young Mature Young Mature Young Mature 
         
ExternalDepend 
× FinDevelop 
0.668
a
 0.091 0.287
a
 0.047 0.698
b
  0.116 0.629
a
 0.108 
(0.124) (0.056) (0.092) (0.047) (0.295) (0.073) (0.162) (0.049) 
         
R
2
 0.389 0.300 0.379 0.297 0.380 0.299 0.390 0.299 
Observations 3,650 1,660 3,599 1,645 3,650 1,660 3,473 1,652 
Differential in 
R&D 
0.024 0.003 0.016 0.003 0.016 0.003 0.022 0.004 
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Table VI 
R&D Regressions: Robustness Checks 
 
Table VI reports OLS regressions with firm-level R&D to assets as the dependent variable. The key 
independent variable is the interaction between industry-level dependence on external funds 
(ExternalDepend) and Country equity issues. All regressions include firm-level control variables (age, 
cash flow, sales, and sales growth) as well as country and industry fixed effects.  The sample is 
described in Table II. Detailed variable definitions are provided in Table I.  Firms are classified as 
small if their average employment during the sample period is in the bottom 70
th
 percentile of all 
sampled firms and large otherwise. In column (1), ExternalDepend measures industry external 
financial dependence over 1990 to 2007 using only U.S. firms that are within 10 years since they first 
appear in Compustat. In column (2) we set R&D to zero for any firm that reports information on fixed 
investment but not R&D. In columns (3) and (4) we exclude all countries with less than 50 firms in the 
original sample (roughly the median firm count). In columns (5) and (6) we drop the three largest 
contributor countries in terms of firms: Japan, the UK, and Canada. The differential in R&D intensity 
measure is explained in Table III.  Standard errors are calculated with clustering at the country level 
and presented in parentheses. Superscripts 
a
,
 b
, and 
c
 indicate that the coefficient estimate for the small 
firms is statistically different from the coefficient estimate for the large firms at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. 
 
   Robustness check  
 Dependence 
young U.S. 
firms 
Set missing 
R&D = 0 
Excl. countries with 
less than 50 firms 
Excl. Japan, UK, & 
Canada 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Firms: All All Small Large Small Large 
       
ExternalDepend × 
Country equity issues 
0.367 0.145 0.612
a 
0.069 0.614
b 
0.106 
(0.086) (0.045) (0.122) (0.058) (0.265) (0.081) 
       
R
2
 0.358 0.281 0.394 0.431 0.337 0.450 
Observations 5,307 13,557 3,444 1,436 1,315 734 
Differential in R&D 0.013 0.005 0.022 0.002 0.022 0.004 
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Table VII 
Firm-Level Fixed Investment and Access to External Finance 
 
Table VII reports OLS regressions with firm-level fixed investment to assets as the dependent 
variable. The key independent variable is the interaction between industry-level dependence on 
external funds (ExternalDepend) and country-level measures of access to external finance. All 
regressions include firm-level control variables (age, cash flow, sales, and sales growth) as well as 
country and industry fixed effects.  The sample is described in Table II.  Detailed variable definitions 
are provided in Table I.  The differential in fixed investment intensity measures the difference in fixed 
investment/assets in an industry at the 75
th
 percentile of external dependence relative to an industry at 
the 25
th
 percentile in a country at the 75
th
 percentile of development versus a country at the 25
th
 
percentile.  Standard errors are calculated with clustering at the country level and presented in 
parentheses.  
 
 Financial development measured as 
 Country 
equity issues 
Accounting 
standards 
IPOs/GDP Country- 
weighted 
leverage 
Credit/GDP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
ExternalDepend × 
Country equity issues 
-0.019     
(0.021)     
     
External depend × 
Accounting standards 
 -0.027    
 (0.013)    
      
External depend × 
IPOs/GDP 
  -0.037   
  (0.028)   
      
External depend × 
Country weighted 
leverage 
   0.056  
   (0.019)  
      
External depend × 
Credit/GDP 
    0.003 
    (0.003) 
      
R
2
 0.272 0.274 0.272 0.272 0.272 
Observations 5,292 5,226 5,292 5,292 5,292 
Differential in fixed inv. -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.001 
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Table VIII 
Intangible Assets, Firm Growth, and Access to External Finance  
 
Table VIII reports OLS regressions where the dependent variable is firm-level intangible assets/net 
fixed assets in columns (1) and (2), firm-level value-added growth in columns (3) and (4), and firm-
level productivity growth in columns (5) and (6). The key independent variable is the interaction 
between industry-level dependence on external funds (ExternalDepend) and Country equity issues. 
The sample is described in Table II. Detailed variable definitions are provided in Table I.  The firm 
size split is described in Table V.  The differential in dependent variable measures the difference in the 
dependent variable in an industry at the 75
th
 percentile of external dependence relative to an industry at 
the 25
th
 percentile in a country at the 75
th
 percentile of development versus a country at the 25
th
 
percentile. The sample average is the average value of the dependent variable in a particular regression 
sample. The regressions in columns (1) and (2) include firm-level control variables (age, cash flow, 
sales, and sales growth) and the regressions in columns (3) to (6) include firm-level control variables 
age and initial size (number of employees the year the firm first enters the sample). All regressions 
include country and industry fixed effects. Standard errors are calculated with clustering at the country 
level and presented in parentheses. Superscripts 
a
,
 b
, and 
c
 indicate that the coefficient estimate for the 
small firms is statistically different from the coefficient estimate for the large firms at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. 
 
 Dependent variable 
 Intangible assets Value-added growth Productivity growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Firms: Small Large Small Large Small Large 
       
ExternalDepend × 
Country equity issues 
7.897
b 
-0.850 1.441
a 
-0.159 0.252
c 
-0.030 
(3.943) (1.244) (0.284) (0.250) (0.124) (0.191) 
       
R
2
 0.224 0.241 0.090 0.218 0.068 0.161 
Observations 3665 1616 3189 1615 3451 1591 
Differential in dependent 
variable 
0.279 -0.030 0.051 -0.006 0.009 -0.001 
Sample average  1.368 0.410 0.130 0.099 0.023 0.018 
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Table IX 
Legal Rules and Financing R&D 
 
Panel A in Table IX reports OLS regressions with firm-level stock issues to assets as the dependent 
variable. In Panel B firm-level R&D to internal cash flow is the dependent variable.  The sample is 
described in Table II. Detailed variable definitions are provided in Table I.  The firm size split is 
described in Table V. All regressions in Table IX include the following country control variables: log 
(GDP/Pop), GDP growth, secondary school enrollment, creditor rights, private property rights 
protection, global growth opportunities, government expenditure/GDP, and inflation rate. Regressions 
in Panel A also include firm-level control variables (age, cash flow, sales, and sales growth) as well as 
industry fixed effects; regressions in Panel B include the same controls less firm cash flow. Standard 
errors are calculated with clustering at the country level and presented in parentheses. Superscripts 
a
,
 b
, 
and 
c
 indicate that the coefficient estimate for the small firms is statistically different from the 
coefficient estimate for the large firms at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Law and External Equity Issues 
 Dependent variable: Stock issues/assets 
Firms: All Small Large All Small Large 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
ASD 0.119 0.129
a 
0.012    
(0.029) (0.031) (0.004)    
Legal origin    0.071 0.079
a 
0.005 
   (0.009) (0.008) (0.002) 
       
R
2
 0.365 0.392 0.203 0.374 0.401 0.202 
Observations 5,185 3,616 1,569 5,185 3,616 1,569 
Panel B: Law and R&D Relative to Cash Flow 
 Dependent variable: R&D/cash flow 
Firms: All All All All Small Large 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
ASD 0.310   0.019 0.340
a 
-0.147 
(0.111)   (0.099) (0.146) (0.045) 
Legal origin  0.204     
  (0.054)     
Country equity 
issues 
  2.449 2.420   
  (0.356) (0.501)   
       
R
2
 0.211 0.213 0.215 0.215 0.254 0.261 
Observations 4,887 4,887 4,887 4,887 3,323 1,564 
 
 
